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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
would apparently have been able to permit discovery of the hos-
pital records on the grounds that the discovery and inspection
would be either an aid in bringing the action or necessary to
preserve information.18 4  If CPLR authority can be found to
support discovery and inspection against a non-party witness prior
to the action, a fortiori it ought to provide a way of securing
the same thing after the action is commenced. The Williams case
has found a way, though its construction may be overly "liberal."
Refusal to Disclose
In Gaffney v. City of New York, 8 5 plaintiff moved to strike
defendants' answers for failure to appear for a pretrial examination.
The court denied the motion and held that since plaintiff had
merely served a no-tice for the pretrial examination the remedy
sought was not available because, the court said, a party must
obtain a court order or a direction of the court before seeking
any penalties against a party for failure to appear for a pretrial
examination.
Under the CPA, it was held that if a mere notice for a pre-
trial examination were served on a party and that party wilfully
failed to appear, the, non-appearing party's pleading could be
stricken.' 86 The court in the principal case, however, has con-
strued Section 3126 of the CPLR which provides that,
if any party . . . refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails
to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed,
the court may make such orders . . . among them . . . an order striking
out pleadings or parts thereof ....
to mean that a party must obtain two orders to obtain relief-
first, an order compelling disclosure and second, if that is dis-
obeyed, an order under section 3126, punishing the disobedience.
Therefore, the court in the present case restricts the applicability
of section 3126 to only that situation in which a party has first
obtained a court order for disclosure. It has been pointed out,
however, that section 3126 can be used in either of two situations-
either where the party has refused to obey an order or where
there is a wilful failure to disclose when the information should
184 See In the Matter of Ausnit, 191 Misc. 390, 78 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup.
Ct.), modified as to scope of examination, 273 App. Div. 953, 73 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1st Dep't 1948), wherein it was held that the testimony of a witness
would be taken before the commencement of an action in order to protect
the rights of one of the parties because the witness might leave the
country before the trial.
18541 Misc. 2d 1049, 247 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
186Nowak v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 286 App. Div. 987, 14 N.Y.S.2d 425 (4th
Dep't 1955); CAR iooy-FoRKoscH, NEW YORK PRAcrlcE §644, at 595 n.32
(8th ed. 1963).
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have been discliosed.' 87  The latter situatioln, it is argued,
arises when a pretrial examination is sought upon notice. 88
General acceptance of the Gaffney construction of section 3126
would frustrate the basic purpose of article 31, which is to
encourage the use of notices and to discourage applications for
court orders except in special circumstances. 8 9  Indeed, it has
already been held, in an instance in which procedure by notice
is available (and it is available in most instances under the
CPLR), that a motion for an order compelling disclosure does
not lie unless the movant has previously sought such disclosure
by notice.190
If notice must first be used where available, as held in Schreter
v. Bruiner,19' and yet no penalty is available for its disobedience,
as held in Gaffney, 1 2 the result is a disclosure article with a
magnanimous quantity of notices, readily available but, unless the
other party voluntarily responds, completely useless.
Use of Interrogatories Precluded in Malpractice Action
Against a Physician
In Fiorentino z. Jaques, 9'3 the defendant in a malpractice
action refused to answer interrogatories propounded pursuant to
Rule 3134 of the CPLR on the ground that personal injury actions
are statutorily excluded from disclosure. The court held that
since the damages in a malpractice action are actually for personal
injuries the plaintiff was not entitled to use interrogatories.
The provisions pertaining to interrogatories were enacted in
the CPLR with several changes from the Advisory Committee's
recommendations. 94  One of these changes forbade interrogatories
in actions to recover damages for injury to property or for personal
injuries resulting from negligence or wrongful death. The basis
for this change was the fear of possible abuse in these actions. 195
Those who disagree with that approach state that interrogatories
generally have not been abused in the federal courts, 196 and find




190 Schreter v. Brumer, (Sup. Ct. Queens County), 150 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 16,
1963, p. 18, col. 7.
191 Ibid.
19241 Misc. 2d 1049, 47 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
19341 Misc. 2d 972, 246 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
1943 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEv YORK CIVIL PRActicE 113130.01,
at 31-241 (1963).
195 See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, 1969 (McKinney's).
196 See Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United States District Courts,
60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1144 (1951).
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